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January 22, 2007

Petro-power and nuclear renaissance | # | P&E — MaT @ 1:05 am

by Michael Klare

Not "Islamo-fascism" but "energo-fascism" – the heavily militarized global struggle over diminishing supplies of energy – will dominate world affairs (and darken the lives of ordinary citizens) in the decades to come. This is so because top government officials globally are increasingly unwilling to rely on market forces to satisfy national energy needs and are instead assuming direct responsibility for the procurement, delivery and allocation of energy supplies. The leaders of the major powers are ever more prepared to use force when deemed necessary to overcome any resistance to their energy priorities. In the case of the United States, this has required the conversion of its armed forces into a global oil-protection service; two other significant expressions of emerging energo-fascism are the arrival of Russia as an "energy superpower" and the repressive implications of plans to rely on nuclear power.
Energy haves and have-nots
With global demand for energy constantly rising and supplies contracting (or at least failing to keep pace), the world is being ever more sharply divided into two classes of nations: the energy haves and have-nots. The haves are the nations with sufficient domestic reserves (some combination of oil, gas, coal, hydropower, uranium and alternative sources of energy) to satisfy their own requirements and be able to export to other countries; the have-nots lack such reserves and must make up the deficit with expensive imports or suffer the consequences. From 1950 to 2000, when energy was plentiful and cheap, the distinction did not seem as obvious as long as the have-nots possessed other forms of power: immense wealth (like Japan); nuclear weapons (like Britain and France); or powerful friends (like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO - and Warsaw Pact countries). For poor countries possessing none of these assets, being a have-not state was a burden even then, contributing mightily to the debt crisis that still afflicts many of them.

Today, these other measures of power have come to seem less important and the distinction between energy haves and have-nots correspondingly more significant – even for wealthy and powerful countries such as the United States and Japan. Surprisingly, there are very few energy haves in the world today. Most notable among these privileged few are Australia, Canada, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Iran, Iraq (if it were ever free of conflict), and a few others.
These countries are in an envious position because they do not have to pay stratospheric prices for imported oil and natural gas and their ruling elites can demand all sorts of benefits – political, economic, diplomatic and military – from the foreign leaders who come calling to procure their energy products. Indeed, they can engage in the delicious game of playing one foreign leader against another, as Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev – a regular guest in Washington and Beijing – has become so adept at doing. Pushed even further, this pursuit of favors can lead to a quest for political domination – with the sale of vital oil and natural-gas supplies made contingent on the recipient’s acquiescing to certain political demands set forth by the seller. No country has embraced this strategy with greater vigor or enthusiasm than President Vladimir Putin’s Russia.
The rising energy superpower
At the end of the Cold War, it appeared as if Russia was a forlorn, wasted ex-superpower, impoverished in spirit, treasure and influence. For years, it was treated with disdain by US officials. Its leaders were forced to swallow humiliating agreements like the expansion of NATO to Moscow’s former satellites in Eastern Europe and the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. To many in Washington, it must have seemed as if Russia was little more than a relic of history, a has-been never again slated to play a significant role in world affairs.

Today Moscow, not Washington, seems to be enjoying the last laugh. With control over Eurasia’s largest reserves of natural gas and coal as well as enormous supplies of petroleum and uranium, Russia is the new top dog – an energy superpower rather than a military one, but a superpower nonetheless. First, a look at the big picture. Russia is the absolute king of natural-gas producers. According to BP (the former British Petroleum), it alone possesses 1.7 quadrillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves, or 27% of the total world supply. This is even more significant than it might appear because Europe and the former USSR rely on natural gas for a larger share of their total energy – 34% – than any other region of the world. (In North America, where oil is the dominant fuel, natural gas accounts for only 25% of the total.) Because Russia is by far the leading supplier of Eurasia’s gas, it enjoys a position of supply dominance unmatched by any energy provider – except Saudi Arabia in the petroleum field. Even in that realm, Russia is the planet’s second leading producer, falling just 1.4 million barrels short of Saudi Arabia’s 11.0 million barrels per day at the start of 2006. Russia also possesses the world’s second-largest reserves of coal (after the US) and is a major consumer of nuclear energy, with 31 operational reactors. Soon after assuming power as president in 1999, Putin set out to convert this superabundance of energy – the economic equivalent of a nuclear arsenal – into the sort of political clout that would restore Russia’s great-power status.

By controlling the flow of energy to other parts of Eurasia from Russia and former Soviet republics such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (whose energy is exported through Russian pipelines), he reasoned, he could exercise the sort of political influence enjoyed by Soviet officials during the heyday of the Cold War. To accomplish this, however, he would have to reverse the wide-ranging privatization of the oil-and-gas industry that occurred in the early 1990s after the breakup of the USSR and bring vital elements of Russia’s privately owned energy industry back under state control. Since there was no legitimate way to do this under Russia’s post-communist legal system, Putin and his associates turned to illegitimate and authoritarian methods to de-privatize these valuable assets. Here, we see another emerging face of energo-fascism. Remarkably, Putin had long before spelled out the rationale for concentrating control over Russia’s energy resources in the state’s hands.

In a 1999 summary of his PhD dissertation on "Mineral Raw Materials in the Strategy for Development of the Russian Economy", he asserted that the Russian state must oversee the utilization of the country’s mineral raw materials – including oilfields in private hands – for the good of the Russian people. "The state has the right to regulate the process of the acquisition and the use of natural resources, and particularly mineral resources, independent of on whose property they are located," he wrote. "In this regard, the state acts in the interests of society as a whole." No better justification for energo-fascism can be imagined.

The most famous expression of this outlook has been the so-called Khodorkovsky Affair. In 2003, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the chief executive officer of Yukos, then Russia’s top oil producer, was arrested on fraud and tax-evasion charges. He had run afoul of Putin by pursuing all sorts of energy deals independent of the state, including possible joint ventures with ExxonMobil, and by supporting anti-Putin political forces inside Russia – either of which would have alone been sufficient to earn him the Kremlin’s wrath.

However, it is now apparent that Putin’s ultimate goal in engineering the arrest was to seize control of Yuganskneftegaz, Yukos’ prime asset, accounting for about 11% of Russia’s oil output. With Khodorkovsky and his top associates in prison awaiting trial, the government auctioned Yuganskneftegaz to a secretive shell company, which then resold it to state-owned Rosneft at a below-market price. In one fell swoop, Putin had managed to dismember Yukos and turn Rosneft into the country’s leading oil producer. The Russian president has also sought to extend state control over the distribution and export of oil and gas by blocking any effort by private firms to build pipelines that would compete with those owned and operated by Gazprom, the state-owned natural-gas monopoly, and Transneft, the state oil-pipeline monopoly. The US and other consuming nations have long pushed for the construction of privatized oil and gas pipelines in Russia to increase the outflow of energy to Europe and other foreign markets as well as to dilute the power of Gazprom and Transneft. The Kremlin has, however, systematically foreclosed all such efforts. If the concentration of ownership of energy assets in the state’s hands through legally dubious means is one dimension of emerging energo-fascism in Russia, a second is the utilization of this power to intimidate have-not states on Russia’s periphery.

The most notable expression of this was the cutoff of natural-gas supplies to Ukraine on January 1, 2006. Ostensibly, Gazprom stopped the flow in a dispute over the pricing of Russian gas, but most observers believe that the action was also intended as a rebuke to Ukraine’s Western-leaning president, Victor A Yushchenko.

Remember, this was in the dead of winter, and natural gas is the main source of heat in Ukraine, as in much of Eastern Europe and the former USSR. Gazprom resumed the flow after a last-minute pricing compromise and vociferous complaints from Western European customers who were suffering their own losses (as the Ukrainians diverted Europe-bound gas for their own use).

This was the moment when it became clear to all that Moscow was fully prepared to open and close the energy spigot as a tool of foreign policy. Since then, Moscow has employed this tactic on several occasions to intimidate other neighboring states in what it terms its "near abroad" (as the US used to speak of Latin America as its "back yard"). Last July 29, claiming a leak, Transneft halted oil shipments to the Mazeikiu refinery in Lithuania after its owners announced its sale to a Polish firm, not a Russian one.

Observers of the move speculate that Russians officials intended to force a Russian takeover of the refinery. In November, Gazprom threatened to more than double the price of natural gas to the former Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic from US$110 to $230 per 1,000 cubic meters. The alternative offered was a cessation of deliveries. Again, political pressure was believed to be at least part of the motive, as Georgia’s pro-Western government had defied Moscow on a wide range of issues. In December, Gazprom pulled the same ploy on Belarus, demanding a major readjustment of prices from a close (and impoverished) ally that had recently been showing mild signs of independence.

This, then, is another face of energo-fascism in Russia: the use of its energy as an instrument of political influence and coercion over weak have-not states on its borders. "It is not that energy is the new atomic weapon," Cliff Kupchan of the Eurasia Group consultancy told The Financial Times, "but Russia knows that petro-power, aggressively and cleverly applied, can yield diplomatic influence."


Big Brother and the nuclear renaissance
The last face of energo-fascism to be discussed here is the inevitable rise in state surveillance and repression attendant on an expected increase in nuclear power. As oil and natural gas become scarcer, government and industry leaders will undoubtedly push for a greater reliance on nuclear power to provide additional energy.

This is a program likely to gain greater momentum from rising concerns over global warming – largely a result of carbon-dioxide emissions created during the combustion of oil, gas and coal. US President George W Bush has repeatedly spoken of his desire to foster greater reliance on nuclear power, and the White House-backed Energy Policy Act of 2005 already provides a variety of incentives for electrical utilities to build new reactors in the United States. Other countries, including France, China, Japan, Russia and India, also plan to up their reliance on nuclear power, greatly adding to the global spread of nuclear reactors. Many problems stand in the way of this so-called renaissance, not least the mammoth costs involved and the fact that no safe system has yet been devised for the long-term storage of nuclear waste. Furthermore, despite many improvements in the safety of nuclear power plants, worries persist about the risk of accidents like those that occurred at Three Mile Island in 1979 in the US state of Pennsylvania and Chernobyl in the Ukrainian SSR in 1986. But this is not the place to weigh these issues. Let me instead focus on two especially worrisome aspects of the future growth of the nuclear power industry: the possible federalization of nuclear-reactor placement in the US and the repressive implications globally of the greater availability of nuclear materials open to diversion to terrorists, criminals and "rogue" states.

Currently, America’s municipalities, counties and states still exercise considerable control over the issuance of permits for the construction of new nuclear power plants, giving citizens in these jurisdictions considerable opportunity to resist the placement of a reactor "in their back yard". For decades, this has been one of the leading obstacles to the construction of new reactors in the US, along with the costly and time-consuming legal process involved in winning over state legislatures, county boards and environmental agencies. If this practice prevails, we are never likely to see a true "renaissance" of nuclear power in the US, even if a few new reactors are built in poor rural areas where citizen resistance is minimal.

The only way to increase reliance on nuclear power, therefore, is to federalize the permit process by shunting local agencies aside and giving federal bureaucrats the unfettered power to issue permits for the construction of new reactors. Unlikely, you say? Well, consider this: the Energy Policy Act of 2005 established a significant precedent for the federalization of such authority by depriving state and local officials of their power to approve the placement of "regasification" plants. These are mammoth facilities used to reconvert liquefied natural gas, transported by ship from foreign suppliers, into a gas that can then be delivered by pipeline to customers in the US. Several localities on the east and west coasts had fought the construction of such plants in their harbors for fear that they might explode (not an entirely far-fetched concern) or become targets for terrorists, but they have now lost their legal power to do so. So much for local democracy. Here’s my worry: that some future US administration will push through an amendment to the Energy Policy Act giving the federal government the same sort of placement authority for nuclear reactors that it now has for regasification plants.

The feds then announce plans to build dozens or even hundreds of new reactors in or near such places as Boston, New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Denver and so on, claiming an urgent need for additional energy. People protest en masse. Local officials, sympathetic to the protestors, refuse to arrest them in droves. But now we’re speaking of defiance of federal, not state or municipal, ordinances. Ergo, the National Guard or the regular army is called up to quell the protests and protect the reactor sites – energo-fascism in action. Finally, there’s another danger in the spread of nuclear power: that it will require a systematic increase in state surveillance of everyone even remotely connected with commercial nuclear energy. After all, every uranium-enrichment facility, nuclear reactor and waste-storage site – and any of the linkages between them – is a potential source of fissionable materials for terrorists, black-market traffickers or rogue states like Iran and North Korea.

This means, of course, that all of the personnel employed in these facilities, and all their contractors and subcontractors (and all their families and contacts) will have to be constantly vetted for possible illicit ties and kept under strict, full-time surveillance. The more reactors there are, the more facilities and contractors who will have to be subjected to this sort of oversight – and the more the security staff itself will have to be subjected to ever-higher levels of surveillance by state security agencies. It’s a formula for Big Brother on a very large scale. And then there’s the special problem of "breeder reactors". These plants produce ("breed") more fissionable material than they consume, often in the form of plutonium, which can, in turn, be burned in power reactors to generate electricity but can also be used as the fuel for atomic weapons. Although such reactors are currently banned in the US, other countries, including Japan, are building them so as to diminish their reliance on fossil fuels and natural uranium, itself a finite resource. As the demand for nuclear energy grows, more countries (even, possibly, the US) are bound to build breeder reactors. But this will vastly increase the global supply of bomb-grade plutonium, requiring an even greater increase in state supervision of the nuclear-power industry in all its aspects.

The state’s iron grip
All the phenomena discussed – the transformation of the US military into a global oil-protection service, the growth of the energy equivalent of a major-power arms race, the emergence of Russia as an energy superpower, and the need for increased surveillance over the nuclear-power industry – are expressions of a single, overarching trend: the tendency of states to extend their control over every aspect of energy production, procurement, transportation and allocation.

This, in turn, is a response to the depletion of world energy supplies and a shift in the locus of energy production from the global North to the global South – developments that have been under way for some time, but are bound to gain greater momentum in the years ahead. Many concerned citizens and organizations – the Apollo Alliance, the Rocky Mountain Institute and the Worldwatch Institute, to name a few – are trying to develop sane, democratic responses to the problems brought about by energy depletion, instability in energy-producing areas, and global warming. Most government leaders, however, appear intent on addressing these problems through increased state controls and a greater reliance on the use of military force. Unless this tendency is resisted, energo-fascism could be the future.

Source: Asia Times

Challenges pile up for BP’s next boss | # | P&E — MaT @ 12:24 am

by Grant Ringshaw

TONY HAYWARD, BP’s chief executive-in-waiting, was keeping a low profile last week. As Lord Browne, the present boss, and John Manzoni, head of refining and marketing, received the equivalent of a public flogging for safety failures at BP’s American refineries, Hayward was apparently on a long-arranged business trip to the United States.

It was fitting that Browne faced the public grilling. As he admitted: “This happened on my watch and as chief executive I have a responsibility to learn from what has occurred.”

But Hayward, a boyish 49-year-old BP lifer, will soon be thrust into the spotlight when he takes the top job on Browne’s retirement at the end of July. Formidable challenges are already piling up.

For a start, investors are restless. “There will be no honeymoon period for Hayward. Investors are looking for action,” said one leading shareholder.

Unsurprisingly, Hayward’s top priority will be to improve safety after the damning findings of the 374-page Baker report last week. But he also faces pressure over BP’s recent disappointing production performance and underperforming share price.

This has led some investors and analysts to suggest that BP should look at more drastic options. These range from a break-up, a merger with a rival oil giant or for BP to use its strong balance sheet to launch a big tender offer for its shares or pay a special dividend.

For a company as proud as BP, last Tuesday was one of the darkest days in its history. The panel, led by former US secretary of state James Baker, delivered a report that lambasted BP for “material deficiencies” in its safety procedures at its five American refineries, failures in leadership and apparent complacency about risks.

The panel, formed after the fatal explosion at BP’s Texas City refinery in 2005 that killed 15 workers and injured 170, accused BP’s management of failing to make process safety a “core value” and having a “corporate blind spot relating to process safety management”.

Although the report did not seek to blame individuals, it pointed out that Browne was a “very visible chief executive” noted for his leadership in reducing carbon-dioxide emissions and developing alternative fuels.

It said: “If Lord Browne had demonstrated a comparable leadership on, and commitment to, process safety, that leadership and commitment would have resulted in a higher level of process safety performance at BP’s US refineries.”

The report noted that while there had been cost-cutting at the refineries, there was no evidence that BP had deliberately cut spending on safety. This conflicted with an earlier interim report from the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board which suggested this had been a factor in the Texas City disaster.

Even before the Baker report, BP’s reputation had been severely tarnished. Over the past 22 months, the oil giant has been hit by numerous troubles at its American operations, including an oil spillage in Alaska, production delays and probes into allegedly irregular trading in the propane and petrol markets.

For most investors the damage had been done long before the publication of the Baker report. Analysts argued that BP would weather the storm and Citigroup and UBS repeated their “buy” recommendations. However, many expect the report’s after-shocks to last for months. But if BP’s shares look cheap to some, the company is still under a cloud. Regulatory problems remain. The US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board’s final report on Texas City is due to be published in March and is expected to deliver a damning verdict on BP’s safety processes.

The most pressing task for Hayward is to prove that BP is taking decisive and sustained action on safety.

“We would like to see BP move forward from this,” said one shareholder. “To revive BP, Hayward will have to ensure that there are no more problems. Everything the company does will be under intense scrutiny. It just cannot afford any more slips.”

BP has made a commitment to adopt the Baker report’s 10 recommendations. These include providing effective leadership on safety, introducing new systems and appointing an independent monitor for at least five years to report to the BP board on the company’s progress.

Since the Texas City disaster, BP has taken significant steps. It has created a senior executive team to oversee safety procedures, and a safety and operations unit that reports direct to the chief executive. It has also beefed up its management, appointing Cynthia Warner to the new role of group vice-president for refining. Bob Malone, the president of BP America who was appointed last year, has been given new powers and responsibilities, including overseeing regulation and safety standards.

BP is increasing spending on the American refineries from an annual $1.2 billion (£610m) to $1.7 billion over the next four years. But given Browne’s pledge to “apply the lessons learnt elsewhere in our global operations”, the costs will be far higher.

Spending money is not enough. BP needs to change its culture and last year launched a review of the entire business. Hayward has indicated his desire for cultural change. In an internal e-mail last month, he said BP’s leadership style was “too directive and doesn’t listen sufficiently well”. Hayward later claimed the comments were directed against himself.

While Browne had a dominant influence over his colleagues, Hayward is thought to favour a more collegiate management style. That is likely to play well with senior colleagues who lost out in the race to be the next chief executive.

These include Manzoni, Robert Dudley, the head of TNK-BP, and Iain Conn, who oversees BP internal functions. There are also suggestions that Peter Sutherland, the BP chairman, will take a more active role in strategic issues.

Hayward needs to address the problem of falling production. Like every oil company, BP has to find more oil and gas and get them out of the ground. Two weeks ago BP dashed hopes that it would meet its annual target of 4.1m to 4.2m barrels per day after poor third-quarter figures.
New projects in the Gulf of Mexico, Azerbaijan and Angola are due to come on stream at the end of 2007, boosting production. BP is also looking to North Africa for growth, particularly as Libya opens up its market. But exploration is a risky business and there remain concerns among some investors about the danger of more opera-tional slip-ups — especially after BP was forced to delay the resumption of production at its flagship and technically complex Thunder Horse platform in the Gulf of Mexico last year.

Hayward must also address concerns about the future of TNK-BP, the Russian joint venture seen as one of BP’s biggest suc-cesses in recent years. Since starting the venture in 2003, BP is thought to have already recouped its $8.5 billion investment costs.

But Russia’s determination to restore government control over energy assets means it is likely that Gazprom, the state-controlled gas giant, will succeed in its ambition of taking a stake in TNK-BP’s huge Kovykta gas field. Last week the national resources ministry stepped up the pressure on TNK-BP by launching checks into whether it had breached licensing terms at Kovykta.

The future shape of BP is also under intense scrutiny. Some analysts have suggested that a break-up, splitting the exploration and production operations from downstream assets such as refineries, could unlock an extra 20% in value for shareholders. However, such a move could be a risky gamble — potentially exposing the two parts of BP to tough competition from the remaining integrated “super major” oil companies.

Hayward could also look at pulling off a merger. Browne is known to have considered a deal with Royal Dutch Shell in 2005, but any mega-merger would face competition problems in America and Europe as well as daunting integration problems.
Meanwhile, some shareholders are understood to be agitating for BP to return more cash. The high oil price means that BP is generating huge amounts of surplus cash, which it has used in $27 billion of share buy-backs over the past two years. The problem is that, so far, the buy-backs have had little impact on the ailing share price.

Even so, BP has a low debt-to-equity ratio of 24%. Some investors say this gives it scope to gear up to 40% — a move that could release about $30 billion to pay for a special dividend or launch a tender offer for more than 10% of its shares.

Both would be big events, but there is no certainty they would be any more effective. Bumping up the dividend could be another option, boosting the yield on the shares and attracting income investors.

However, observers say that Hayward, who is described by insiders as “shrewd and deceptively tough”, is unlikely to consider the more radical options — at least not yet.

“He needs to get the organisation working the way he wants it to. There is a lot of internal work to do before he can consider doing big deals or changing the shape of the company,” said one analyst.

In other words, there are unlikely to be any quick fixes. Although Hayward has plenty of options, turning BP round is a big challenge and is likely to be a long slog.

Etiquetas: BP, Kenneth Ramírez Domínguez

 

 

New report deals body blow to BP | # | P&E — MaT @ 12:19 am

BP is to receive another hammer blow to its reputation as a new report will for the first time directly link cost-cutting with the fatal Texas City refinery blast.

Carolyn Merritt, chairman of the US Chemical Safety Board, is accusing BP of complacency and disregard for inherent danger, failings that she says went to the very top of the company.

Cuts to maintenance budgets had a ‘causal relationship’ with the explosion at Texas City in March 2005 that killed 15 people, she said. Merritt told The Observer that the impact of cost-cutting on safety would be central in the CSB’s report into the causes of the accident. The report is due on 20 March.

The Baker Report, commissioned by BP on the advice of the CSB, had no remit to affix blame or responsibility, nor to determine the causes of the blast.

While the report noted significant cuts at Texas City by BP and Amoco, which owned the refinery before it was taken over by the UK company in 1998, it did not try to establish whether cost-cutting could have impacted on safety. The CSB’s remit is to establish the cause of the accident. Merritt says one of the key causes was budget cuts, adding that whether executives intended to cut safety budgets was not relevant.

Merritt said: ‘Budget cuts had an impact on safety and that impact on safety had a causal relationship with what happened on March 23. We have an iron-clad case for the impact of cost cutting on safety. We will be making those conclusions in our report.’

She said that despite a series of previous ‘geyser-like releases’ of flammable liquid similar to the one that caused the explosion, ‘complacency and disregard for the inherent danger of what was being done was at every level of the organisation to the very top’. She added: ‘The message that was communicated was that cost-cutting and maximising profits was the most important thing.’

A BP spokesman said: ‘We have always said that budget cuts had no impact on safety. The [Baker] panel said it could not find a link.’ He added that BP’s spending on its five US refineries increased on average by 10 per cent a year from 2000 to 2005.

However, CSB officials point to a history of cost-cutting at Texas City: from 1992 to 1998 maintenance spending fell by 41 per cent. When the figures are extended to the eight years between 1992 and 2000 the fall was 84 per cent. They add that reports commissioned by BP said clearly that funding was inadequate, but attempts to increase spending were not effective.
CSB officials also point to a ‘budget challenge’ of 25 per cent ($48m) across BP’s five US refineries in late 2004. They say the ‘challenge’ included items such as sustaining capital expenditure on maintaining the safe operation of the plant, and compliance with regulations. BP ultimately increased spending in 2005, in the aftermath of the accident.

BP chief executive Lord Browne is to travel to the US this week to discuss implementation of the Baker report, which the company has accepted. He will be accompanied by his successor, Tony Hayward, and by John Manzoni, head of refining and marketing.

Source: The Observer

Etiquetas: BP, Kenneth Ramírez Domínguez

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